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Corporate Pension Plans and Investment Choices:  
Bargaining or Conforming? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the impacts of defined-benefit (DB) pension plans on the corporate 
investment choices between diversifying and non-diversifying investments. We find a firm’s 
DB plan coverage is negatively associated with its propensity of making a major investment. 
Subject to a major investment decision, however, the firms with higher DB plan coverage is 
more likely to diversify, i.e. acquire firms abroad or in other industries, rather than invest in 
fixed assets or make non-diversifying (i.e. domestic horizontal) acquisitions. Moreover, in 
diversifying acquisitions, they are more likely to invest in countries or industries with strongly 
unionized workforce. Further analysis on post-investment performance shows that firms with 
higher DB plan coverage experience a greater improvement in operating profitability after a 
diversifying acquisition, and the improvement mainly comes from a higher asset turnover 
rather than cost reduction. On the other hand, DB plan sponsoring firms experience a decline 
in profitability after a large capital expenditure or a non-diversifying acquisition. We propose 
both bargaining motive and conforming motive can explain these results.   
JEL classification: G30; G31; G34  
Keywords: Defined-benefit pension; DB plan coverage; bargaining power; Conforming 
motive, Diversifying acquisitions  
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I. Introduction 
 
At present there is a growing amount of research on how the corporate-sponsored 
defined-benefit (DB hereafter) pension plans affect corporate investment decisions. Among 
others, Rauh (2006) shows that the mandatory contribution to DB pension funds results in 
lower investment in fixed assets. Chang, Kang and Zhang (2012) conclude that firms with 
more DB pension plan deficits are more likely to engage in value-enhancing mergers. Cocco 
and Volpin (2013) indicate that firms sponsoring DB pension plans are less likely to be a 
takeover target while the acquirer firms with DB pension plans are more likely to pay in cash 
than their counterparts without such plans. The above studies mainly focus on how DB plan 
affects a particular type of investment. However, we still know little about its impacts on 
corporate investment decisions and the channels through which pension plans affect corporate 
investment choice.  
Our paper contributes to the literature by demonstrating that DB pension plans affect 
the firms’ decisions on capital expenditure and choice of investment industries and locations. 
We propose that both the bargaining motive, and the conforming motive implied by the 
stakeholder theory can explain firms’ investment choices. The bargaining motive predicts that 
firms invest strategically to reduce employees’ influence over corporate resource allocations. 
Previous studies and anecdotal evidences widely suggest that employees have strong 
incentives to fight for better compensation through threats of actions, especially in good states 
of firm performance. We argue that the existence of DB pension plans reflects employees’ 
bargaining power because unionized workers generally have a much higher participation rate 
in DB plans than non-unionized workers.1  When facing strong employees’ bargaining power, 
                                                            
1
 Nowadays, although the powers of labour unions are declining and more and more firms are shifting their 
pension plans towards defined-contribution schemes, unionized workers still have a much higher participation 
rate in DB plans than non-unionized workers (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). At present when firms shift 
away from DB to DC plans, they mostly keep the pension benefits of existing employees unchanged while 
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the firms would respond strategically by changing their investment decisions. Several 
theoretical models imply that firms can strengthen their bargaining position against the 
employees through under-investment (Baldwin, 1983; Grout, 1984), cross-industry 
diversification (Rose, 1991), moving their investments towards overseas plants (Lommerud, 
Meland and Sorgard, 2003; and Eckel and Egger, 2009), or carrying out international or 
vertical acquisitions (Lommerud, Staume and Sorgard, 2006).2  
The conforming motive, on the other hand, predicts that firm managers would consider 
employees’ benefits and concerns while aiming at increasing shareholders’ value in 
investment decisions. Recent studies on the stakeholder theory of capital structure show that 
firms would take employees’ benefits into consideration when deciding their debt policies 
(Bae, Kang and Wang, 2013) and higher debt ratios do result in higher compensation to top 
managers and employees (Chemmanur, Cheng and Zhang, 2013). Compared to defined-
contribution (DC hereafter) pension plans, DB plans are not only more costly to maintain 
(Comprix and Muller, 2011; Rauh, Stefanescu and Zeldes, 2013) but also expose sponsoring 
firms to additional funding risks arising from financial market fluctuations, uncertainties in 
participants’ longevity, employees’ mobility, among others (Rauh, 2006; Shivdasani and 
Stefanescu, 2010; Cocco and Volpin, 2013). Subjecting to competitive disadvantages in their 
operating industries, a DB plan sponsoring firm has strong incentives of investing abroad or 
other industries to reduce its financial risk. Previous studies find that geographical or product-
market diversification provides benefits by moderating stock return volatility (Fatemi, 1984), 
lowering the cost of capital (Yan, 2006; Hovakimian, 2011; Hann, Ogneva and Ozbas, 2013), 
and increasing financial flexibility (Jang, 2016). From the employees’ perspective, they are 
essentially the long-term creditors of DB plan sponsoring firms, and their propensity of 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
excluding new hires from DB pension plans. Therefore, the existence of DB plans and the extent thereof indicate 
the employees’ bargaining power in a firm. 
2
 Besides changing their investment strategies, firms can strategically reduce the financial resources on the 
bargaining table by adopting a tightened financial policy to increase their bargaining power. See Perotti and 
Spier (1993), Klasa, Maxwell, Molina (2009), and Matsa (2010) for examples and detailed discussions.  
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receiving full pension benefits upon retirement depends on their employers’ financial viability. 
As a result, employees receiving DB-plan benefits also hope their employers to invest safely 
and reduce the cash-flow risk by diversification.  
In short, both bargaining motive and conforming motive indicate not only a lower 
propensity of investment but also an investment preference towards aboard or new industries 
over local or similar industries. However, the two theories predict differently on the post-
investment performances, as well as choices of target countries and target industries in 
diversifying (cross-border or cross-industry) acquisitions. 3  Firstly, the bargaining motive 
implies that DB-plan sponsoring firms achieve better operating performance by gaining a 
stronger bargaining power against local employees. Consequently, the improvement in 
performance after a diversifying acquisition should mostly come from reduction of costs, 
especially labour-related expenses. The conforming motive, however, suggests that the DB 
plan sponsoring firms would improve their operating performance by other methods such as 
augmenting the operating efficiency rather than cutting labour-related expenses. Secondly, the 
bargaining motive predicts DB-plan sponsoring firms to invest in countries or industries with 
weak unionized workforce so as to prevent incumbent labour unions from joining force with 
unions in the countries or industries of new investments. The conforming motive, however, 
predicts DB-plan sponsoring firms would invest in countries or industries with strong 
unionized workforce. Although investing abroad or in other industries can reduce DB plan 
sponsoring firms’ cash flow risks, the decision could also be viewed as an unfriendly strategy 
of keeping new investments out of touch by existing employees. 4  In order to gain the 
employees’ support for new investments, DB-plan sponsoring firms have to commit and 
                                                            
3
 In the M&A literature, diversifying acquisitions mostly refer to cross-industry acquisitions. However, as firms 
can diversify their risks by acquiring firms or assets abroad, we classify diversifying acquisitions as either cross-
border or cross-industry acquisitions, and non-diversifying acquisitions as domestic horizontal acquisitions.  
4
 For example, a firm’s foreign subsidiary is not liable for the parent firm’s DB plan liabilities. As a result, the 
parent firm’s DB pension plans are protected by fewer assets. We thank the guest editor for providing this 
argument.   
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cement their relations with unionized workforce by investing in countries or industries with 
strong union power but higher labour productivity.5 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that empirically tests the 
implications of both bargaining and conforming motives of corporate investment. Utilizing 
information gleaned from US IRS 5500 filings that cover all US pension plans with at least 
100 participants, we construct our proxy for DB plan coverage as the ratio of DB pension plan 
assets to total pension assets. Examining a sample of 27,883 US manufacturing firm-years in 
1990-2003, we find that DB plan coverage is negatively associated with the propensity of a 
major investment defined as a large capital expenditure or an acquisition of firm. A one-
standard-deviation increase in DB plan coverage is associated with a reduction of 0.062 in 
odds ratio for acquisition and 0.244 in odds ratio for large capital expenditure. Subject to a 
major investment decision, a firm with higher DB plan coverage is more likely to acquire 
rather than to invest in fixed assets. A one-standard-deviation of increase in DB-plan coverage 
is related to an increase of 0.217 in odds ratio of acquisition versus capital expenditure. 
Among various forms of acquisitions, a firm with higher DB plan coverage prefers 
diversifying acquisition over non-diversifying acquisition. A one-standard-deviation of 
increase in DB plan coverage is linked with an increase of 0.184 in odds ratio of diversifying 
acquisition versus non-diversifying acquisition. The above findings are consistent with both 
bargaining motive and conforming motive that higher DB-plan coverage results in less 
investment and the dominance of diversifying acquisitions over non-diversifying investments.  
To test the bargaining motive versus the conforming motive, we first examine the 
financial impacts of DB plan coverage by investigating changes in operating performance 
around major investment. Our empirical result indicates that firms with higher DB-plan 
coverage tend to have lower return on assets after a big capital expenditure or a non-
                                                            
5
 We thank the anonymous referee for providing this direction to disentangle the two hypotheses. 
7 
 
diversifying acquisition. Further analysis shows that the result is related to a decline in 
operating profit margin and increase in pension expense, but unrelated to change in asset 
turnover. The finding is consistent with the bargaining motive that firms with higher DB plan 
coverage would avoid large local investments because such investments will further expose 
their assets to local union forces while workers in the same industry with common interests 
can join forces more easily.  
On the other hand, our empirical evidence shows that diversifying acquisitions bring 
in higher return on assets for firms with higher DB plan coverage, and the improvement in 
operating profitability is related to improvement in asset turnover instead of cost cutting effort. 
Therefore, the finding is inconsistent with the bargaining motive but consistent with the 
conforming motive which indicates that cost cutting is not the main motive of diversifying 
acquisitions.  
We then examine the impact of DB plan coverage on acquirers’ choice of target 
location and target industry in diversifying acquisitions. The bargaining motive predicts that 
firms with higher DB-plan coverage will invest in countries and industries with weaker union 
power, while the conforming motive predicts the opposite. Two measurements are employed 
to test these two predictions. For each cross-border acquisition, we gauge a target country’s 
labour power with the collective relations law index constructed by Botero et al. (2004). We 
then compute the average value of all countries in which a firm has carried out it cross-border 
deals to measure its preference of labour power in cross-border acquisitions. We measure 
firm’s preference of labour power in cross-industry acquisitions in a similar way by using the 
industry unionization rate provided by Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson available at 
www.unionstats.com. Our finding supports the conforming motive but not the bargaining 
motive. Together with the above finding for operating performances, we suggest that 
weakening labour bargaining power is not the main objective of diversifying acquisitions by 
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DB plan sponsoring firms. Instead, those firms are willing to consider employees’ job-related 
concerns when they choose the location and industry of acquisition.  
We perform additional tests to show the robustness of our main findings. First, 
previous studies find that other than employees’ bargaining power, cross-border acquisitions 
are driven by many factors such as cross-border trade activity, corporate tax rate, institutional 
ownership, and so on. Our main results for investment choice survive after controlling those 
factors. Second, we perform an additional test to address the potential endogeneity concern. 
Examining change in performance rather than the level of performance can eliminate omitted 
time-invariant firm characteristics that could cause a spurious relation between DB plan 
coverage and firm performance. However, some time-varying omitted firm or industry 
characteristics may still simultaneously affect DB plan coverage and firm performance. For 
example, technological development and trade liberalization may change a firm’s investment 
opportunities and labour policies. We address the endogeneity concern by using instrumental 
variable regressions with firm fixed effects. The main results are qualitatively unchanged, 
implying the robustness of our empirical evidences.  
This study contributes to the literature in two ways. Firstly, although the impact of 
employees’ bargaining power on corporate investment choice has been investigated 
theoretically, the empirical evidences are scant (Clougherty et al., 2014). We find that higher 
DB plan coverage induces more diversifying acquisitions rather than non-diversifying 
acquisitions or capital expenditures. Although the finding is consistent with the theoretical 
predictions proposed by Rose (1991), Lommerud, Straume and Sorgard (2003 & 2006), and 
Eckel and Egger (2009) that firms shift capital outside their core areas in response to 
increasing labour power, our evidence suggests that cutting costs is not the main objective of 
diversifying acquisitions by DB plan sponsoring firms. At the same time, DB plan sponsoring 
firms indeed avoid investing in existing industries because cost synergies are difficult to 
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realize when labour power is strong. In sum, our findings support both bargaining and 
conforming motives of DB plan sponsoring firms in investment decisions.  
Secondly, our study sheds new light on the growing literature on cross-border mergers. 
Previous studies find that at the aggregate level, the volumes of cross-border merger are 
driven by country factors such as accounting standards, corporate governance, investor 
protection (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008), taxation (Scholes and 
Wolfson, 1990; Huizinga and Voget, 2009), culture (Ahern, Daminelli and Fracassi, 2015), as 
well as geographical distance, quality of accounting disclosure, and bilateral trade (Erel, Liao 
and Weisbach, 2014). At the firm level, cross-border mergers create value by binding targets 
from countries with lower standards of corporate governance and investor protection with the 
higher standards in bidders’ countries (Bris, Brisley and Cabolis, 2008; Bris and Cabolis, 
2008), governing targets by foreign institutional investors (Ferreira, Massa and Matos, 2010), 
and disciplining poorly performing CEOs in countries with weak investor protection (Lel and 
Miller, 2015). Our results show that corporate pension plans induce firms to invest abroad but 
the motivations are more complicated than reducing labour influence through shifting assets 
abroad or to other industries.   
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides institutional 
background and reviews prior research. Section 3 describes data and construction of key 
variables. Section 4 presents the main empirical results. Section 5 compares our research with 
other studies for cross-border M&As and provides robustness check. Finally, Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Institutional Background and Literature Review 
Firms generally offer two types of pension plans to their employees, namely defined-
benefit plans and defined-contribution plans. The main difference between DB and DC plans 
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is that the firms with DB plans promise the employees a fixed retirement benefit defined by a 
given formula, which is usually a function of the employee’s tenure, wage (usually in the final 
year), and sometimes age, while the firms with DC plans provide fixed annual contributions 
to a pension fund. In recent years, there has been an increasing trend for US companies to 
switch from DB to DC pension plans or freeze the existing DB plans and shut out new hires. 
The share of DB plan assets has dropped from 65% in 1995 to 40% in 2005 (Broadbent, 
Palumbo and Woodman, 2006). From the employer’s perspective, DC plans are less costly to 
maintain than DB plans. A direct benefit of freezing DB plans is that the pension liability is 
immediately reduced by the amount of expected future benefits, which significantly improves 
funding status of plans and the bottom line (Comprix and Muller, 2011). Rauh, Stefanescu 
and Zeldes (2013) find that firms save 2.7-3.6% of payroll per year by shifting from DB to 
DC plans over a ten-year horizon. Moreover, shifting to DC plans reduce firms’ uncertainty 
for their future contributions to DB plans which are affected by the expected rate of return of 
asset and market interest rates. 
 
2.1 DB plan and employees’ bargaining power 
The extent of DB plans reflects employees’ bargaining power for three reasons. First, 
compared with a DC plan, an employee’s pension benefit under a typical DB plan is “back-
loaded” and is mostly predetermined by a formula based on his (her) earnings before 
retirement (Kapinos, 2009). As a result, employees in DB plans face a higher cost of job 
change and their values of outside options are lower. They are more concerned for and more 
loyal towards their employers’ long term prospects than employees in DC plans. Employees 
covered by DB plans are hence expected to have strong incentives to stay and bargain 
collectively with their employers when their benefits are threatened, while employees under 
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DC plans are more likely to consider outside options and leave if they are not satisfied with 
the pension benefits offered by the employers.  
Secondly, many corporate-sponsored DB plans are reached through collective 
bargaining and most of them were set up in earlier years when labour unions were strong 
enough to protect the employees’ post-retirement benefits. Although labour union power is 
declining and there is a growing trend of moving towards DC plans, unionized workers still 
have a much higher participation rate in DB plans than non-unionized workers. A survey by 
the Bureau of Labour Statistics (2013) shows that the unionized workers enjoy better 
retirement benefits than the non-unionized workers. The former group is much more likely to 
own corporate-sponsored pension plans (86% versus 45%), and to be covered by the DB 
plans (68% versus 11%). As firms are shifting to DC plans due to the cost disadvantages of 
DB plans, the percentage of frozen DB plans is also much higher for non-unionized workers 
than that for their unionized counterparts (33% versus 15%). In contrast, the participation 
rates of the defined contribution (DC) pension plans are very close for the two groups of 
workers (44% versus 42%).6  
Thirdly, most employers have been shifting away from DB plans in recent years. They 
keep the pension benefits of existing employees unchanged and exclude new hires from DB 
pension plans so as to reduce the resistance from current workers and labour unions. This 
strategy is believed to reduce the alignment between new and existing employees, and hurt 
employees’ bargaining power and collective forces. Indeed, quite a few of the labour strikes 
nowadays are caused by employers’ attempting to freeze old DB plans while offering DC 
plans to new employees. 7  For example, Bob Woods, spokesperson of The International 
                                                            
6
 See “National Compensation Survey: Employee Benefits in the United States, March 2013” by Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. 
7
 There are generally two types of pension plan freeze. A “hard” freeze eliminates the accrual of new benefits for 
all employees, while a “soft” freeze excludes some classes of employees, usually new employees, from the 
accrual of benefits under the old plan. 
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Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM), told In These Times during the 
strike against Lockheed Martin in April 2012: 
The first time..., they take away pension for new hires. Next time around, when new 
hires [are in the union], they say ‘we are going to freeze the pension.’ Of course, the 
new hires that don't have a pension aren't going to strike, so then the pension is 
frozen ... Companies like Lockheed Martin simply want to eliminate defined benefit 
pensions plans. 
Facing strong employees’ bargaining power, the firms would respond strategically by 
changing their investment decisions. Baldwin (1983) and Grout (1984) theoretically 
demonstrate that the renegotiation risk causes firms to under-invest in the face of strong 
labour bargaining power, as evidenced by Hirsch (1992), and Bronars and Deere (1993). The 
firms can also improve their bargaining position in relation to their employees by moving 
their investments towards overseas plants, or carrying out international or vertical 
acquisitions.8 The international oligopoly model by Lommerud, Staume and Sorgard (2006) 
shows that a cross-border acquisition triggers increased competition between labour unions 
for job security and firm’s commitment to future investments because the firm can exploit the 
potential of shifting inputs and production between plants in different countries. Such union 
rivalry consequently leads to workers’ concession on wage, which has been an important 
determinant of a firm’s decision to invest abroad. Moreover, it is more difficult for unions in 
different locations to cooperate than unions in the same location. This reality further weakens 
the employees’ bargaining power. The equilibrium market structure implies that a cross-
border acquisition is an effective corporate strategy to reduce union rents. Lommerud, Meland 
and Sorgard (2003), and Eckel and Egger (2009) predict that investing and producing abroad 
can increase a firm’s bargaining power by allowing it to continue its operations even in the 
                                                            
8
 Alternatively, firms can strategically reduce the financial resources on the bargaining table by adopting a 
tightened financial policy to increase their bargaining power. See Perotti and Spier (1993), Klasa, Maxwell, 
Molina (2009), and Matsa (2010) for examples and detailed discussions.  
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case of disagreement with local workers.  The theoretical model developed by Rose (1991) 
also implies that cross-industry diversification can improve a firm’s ability to take strikes and 
reduce wage settlements. It can be expected that diversifying acquisitions would have a 
similar effect on employees’ bargaining power as cross-border acquisitions. As labour unions 
exist to protect workers with similar working conditions and interests, it is difficult for labour 
unions representing workers in different industries to collude with each other. 
Diversifying acquisitions are also less likely to induce the “envy effect” than non-
diversifying acquisitions because the acquired overseas businesses are remotely comparable 
to the original one. Goel and Thakor (2005) demonstrate that an agent’s utility increases with 
what she/he has and decreases with what others have due to social status (Frank, 1984) or 
equity considerations (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). Envious workers may even attempt to 
sabotage other workers (Lazear, 1989). Goel and Thakor (2005) also argue that people are 
jealous of those who are close and comparable to them. In a workplace, workers will compare 
their compensation packages with others doing the same tasks. As DB plans generally offer 
higher and more stable post-retirement benefits than DC plans, it is likely that employees 
under DC plans will be envious of their colleagues under DB plans. Therefore, even a firm 
with high DB plan coverage may have identified a potential target with low DB-plan coverage 
in the same industry or in the same country, it may have to consider the additional costs and 
problems in lining up the compensation packages of employees from different original firms.  
The above bargaining view implies that DB plan sponsoring firms can dilute the 
influence of labour unions by investing in foreign countries and industries with weak presence 
of labour unions. In particular, by shifting capital abroad, firms are subject to less scrutiny by 
local labour unions over corporate resources if the local unions do not have a strong partner in 
the foreign countries where the firm assets locate.       
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2.2 DB plan and financial risk 
In offering a DB pension plan, a sponsoring firm is not free from financial liability 
after making its contributions to the plan. The value of DB plan assets is volatile and depends 
on quite a few of factors including a pension fund’s asset allocation, risk management and 
investment performance, as well as the pension plan participant’s longevity and employee 
mobility. When the market value of the pension asset is less than the pension liability, the 
pension plan is in deficit. In this case, the sponsoring firms are required to make up the 
difference.  
Previous studies suggest DB plan sponsoring firms have larger financial burdens and 
are more opaque than its counterpart. Rauh (2006) indicates that the mandatory contribution 
to DB pension changes a firm’s internal financial resources and reduces its capital 
expenditures. Bakke and Whited (2012) show that Rauh’s finding is driven by the sample of 
heavily underfunded firms. They further find that the mandatory contribution also affects 
research, development and employment growth. In addition to the mandatory contribution, the 
DB pension deficit is also a long-term liability to the firm. Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2010) 
find that firms’ debt ratios are indeed 35% higher if the pension liabilities had been 
considered as debt, and firms with higher pension liabilities have lower debt ratios, consistent 
with the trade-off theory of capital structure. All of these contribute to the uncertainty of the 
firms’ internal financial resources. In addition, Cocco and Volpin (2013) argue that DB 
pension plans increase firms’ information asymmetry and therefore act as a takeover deterrent 
when the potential acquirers are worried about the lemon problem. They show that firms 
sponsoring DB plans are less likely to be a takeover target. Moreover, these firms are more 
likely to use cash rather than stock when acquiring other firms. The explanation they propose 
is that the uncertainty in the value of DB plan liabilities expose the merger counterparty to 
additional risk and information asymmetry. Therefore, DB plan is costly to maintain and the 
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uncertainty in the pension fund investment increases firms’ financial risk.  
 Financial burdens may harm firm’s relationship with its employees and other 
stakeholders when firm-specific or asset-specific investments are subject to a large cost in 
liquidation (Titman, 1984). Therefore, firms in financial distress always face the choice 
between losing their business partners and valuable employees, and using resources to 
maintain such relationships. Berk, Stanton and Zechner (2010) theoretically show that the 
costs of human capital can sometimes be so high to stop firms from issuing debt. Chemmanur, 
Cheng and Zhang (2013) empirically find that employee pay is positively related to financial 
leverage. Both suggest that labour costs affect the financing decision.  
 Motivated by these studies, we argue that DB plan sponsoring firms with pension 
liabilities have stronger needs than their counterparts to address labour concerns in their 
investment decisions by investing less or making investments that will not exacerbate their 
financial risks. As diversification can reduce cash flow volatility and therefore the likelihood 
of bankruptcy, we expect DB plan sponsoring firms are more likely to acquire firms aboard or 
in other industries. However, regarding diversifying acquisitions as a strategy to reduce their 
bargaining power, the employees may fight hard to block acquisitions that shift capital outside 
the core businesses. To maintain the relationship with their employees, the firms can show 
their conformity to unionized workforce by investing in countries with high labour protection 
standards and union coverage such as the Scandinavian countries, or in industries with strong 
presence of labour unions. Therefore, the conforming view suggests that DB plan sponsoring 
firms may invest in countries or industries with stronger presence of labour unions to 
moderate employees’ concern about financial risks and bargaining power.     
 
3. Data Sample, Construction of Variables and Empirical Strategy 
3.1 Data sample 
16 
 
Our sample covers the manufacturing firms (SIC 2000-3999) in CRSP/Compustat 
Merged Database and IRS 5500 filings compiled by Centre for Retirement Research at 
Boston College from 1990 to 2007. We extend the data to 2013 by downloading the IRS 5500 
filings from The Department of Labour. We join records from CRSP/Compustat and IRS 
filings using Employer Identification Number (EIN), the only identifier available in both 
databases. We include only manufacturing firms where labour union activities tend to be more 
intensive. In addition, DB pension plans are more prevalent in labour-intensive manufacturing 
industries than in hi-tech or service industries. We exclude firms with missing values for the 
regressions on investment choice. Our final sample consists of 27,883 firm-years. 
The IRS 5500 filings cover both DB and DC pension plans with at least 100 
participants. Employers are required to file a separate form for each of their plans. The 
information recorded contains type and status of plan, summary statistics of participants, plan 
assets and liabilities, etc. In addition, employers are required to file Actuarial Information 
(Schedule B) for each DB plan, including in particular the estimation of projected benefit 
liabilities and the funding status of the plan. In our study, we aggregate plan-level data to 
firm-level.   
 
3.2 DB-plan coverage 
The main explanatory variable of this study is DB plan coverage (DB_Cover), defined 
as the value of DB plan assets over the total assets of both DB and DC plans available on IRS 
5500 filings. Since many DB plans are usually maintained only for senior employees while 
new hires are excluded from it, an implicit assumption of this measurement is that more 
weight is given to more senior employees who tend to have higher values in their pension 
accounts. This is consistent with our assumption that DB plan coverage may reflect 
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employees’ bargaining power because senior employees are more likely to occupy higher 
occupational ranks and therefore be more influential.  
There are two potential biases of this measure of DB plan coverage. First, the value of 
pension assets fluctuates with market conditions. To check the robustness of our findings, we 
use the number of employees covered by the DB-plan as an alternative measurement and the 
results are qualitatively unchanged9. Secondly, Compustat provides consolidated financial 
information on parent level, while IRS 5500 filings can be made by group subsidiaries rather 
than the parents. Since the filings do not provide any information about the parent company of 
the filer, we cannot consolidate all pension plan data to the parent level. Therefore, our 
calculated pension assets may underestimate the actual pension assets for a company with 
subsidiaries. However, the missing information should add noise rather than systematic bias 
to our measure of DB plan coverage because the DB plan assets are scaled by total pension 
assets rather than total firm assets. 
Unlike most previous studies on DB pension plans (e.g. Shivdasani and Stefanescu, 
2010; Chang, Kang and Zhang, 2012; Cocco and Volpin, 2013), our DB plan coverage 
accounts for not only the existence but also the extent of DB plans relative to DC plans, which 
allows us to compare among firms offering different levels of DB pension plans to employees.  
 
3.3 Major investment decision 
We constructed two indicators to gauge the major investment decisions in a year. The 
first one is the major capital expenditure decision, LargeCAPX, which equals one if a firm’s 
capital expenditure scaled by lagged one-period total assets is above the 90th percentile for all 
sample firms in the year.10 In a robustness check, we use 75th percentile as a cut-off and the 
results are qualitatively the same. The second one is major mergers and acquisitions, Acquire, 
                                                            
9
 We do not report the results due to the space constraint, but they are available upon request. 
10
 In Compustat database, capital expenditures exclude property, plant and equipment of acquired companies, 
and net assets of businesses acquired. 
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which equals one if a firm acquires at least one firm in the year. Specifically, we collect from 
Thomson One for all mergers and acquisition transactions that are indicated as “Mergers”. We 
exclude acquisitions of minority interests or acquisitions of remaining interests because they 
do not involve a change in control. We also exclude acquisitions of assets because those deals 
tend to be small.11   
 For acquirers in a year, we further check if they acquire foreign firms or firms in other 
industries, and define three types of mergers: (1) CrossBorder which equals one if a firm 
acquires at least one firm out of the United States in the year; (2) CrossIndustry which equals 
one if a firm acquires at least one firm belonging to a different 4-digit SIC code; and (3) CBI 
which equals one if either CrossBorder or CrossIndustry equals one.  
  
3.4 Empirical strategy and explanatory variables 
To examine the choice of major investment, we use the logit model for binary choices 
and the multinomial logit model for multiple (> 2) choices. More specifically, for each firm k 
that faces N+1 alternatives in year t, the utility of choice j in year t+1 is defined as follows: 
 = ′ + ,  j = 0, 1,…, N, 
where 	is a set of firm-specific and industry-specific variables of interest in year t.  Given 
this utility function, each firm chooses the investment type that maximizes its utility.  The 
probability that firm k choose jth choice is modelled as,   
	
 = | =  = 	(
′)∑ 	(
′) . 
The model implies that we can compute the log-odds ratio of two alternative, j and h, as: 
                                                            
11
 Our definition of Acquire does not distinguish large M&As from small M&As because Thomson One does not 
report deal values for a significant percentage of M&A transactions. From our initial collection of all M&As in 
1970-2014, about 54% of mergers report deal values, while only about 32% of asset acquisitions report deal 
values. 
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 	 = ′( − ). 
Suppose h is the base case. Conventionally, we normalize the base case by setting   to zero 
(pp. 844, Greene, 2008), so that we can identify the effect of firm-specific variables on the 
odds ratio by observing .     
 We include the following firm-specific variables for the investment-choice models:  
1. DB_Cover, the key explanatory variable of interest;  
2. CashFlow, the sum of net income and depreciation minus dividends, divided by lagged 
total assets;  
3. Q, the market-to-book ratio of assets; 
4. Size, the natural logarithm of total assets in 2005 constant value;  
5. Tang, net property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets; 
6. WC, net working capital less cash, divided by total assets;  
7. Div, cash dividend divided by lagged total assets;  
8. CumRet, the 12-month cumulative stock return in fiscal year t. 
All variables are one-period lagged the choice variables and they are winsorized at 1st and 99th 
percentiles of respective distributions. Furthermore, year dummies () are included to 
control for all firm-invariant variables and adjusted for trends like nationwide legislation or 
policy changes. The dummies for 2-digit SIC industries (2) are added to control for all 
unobserved factors that are time-invariant and peculiar to each industry. 
  
3.5 Summary statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 reports the distribution as well as the summary statistics for DB 
plan coverage and investment choices of the sample firms by year. Panel B reports the 
summary statistics of other key firm-specific variables used for our analysis.  
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As the explanatory variables are lagged by one year relative to the investment decision 
variables, the summary statistics in Panel A for DB_Cover are for the period 1990-2013, and 
the summary statistics for Merger, CrossBorder, CrossIndustry, and CBI are for the period 
1991-2014. Column 1 shows that the number of sample firms increases from 1990 to 1996, 
and then experiences abrupt drops in 1999 and 2000.12 The number of firms picks up again in 
2001, but experiences a gradual decline after 2004. Consistent with the summary statistics 
documented in previous studies, columns 2&3 indicate that DB-plan coverage (DB_Cover) 
dropped from 30.6% in 1990 to 16.1% in 2012.  
Column 3 presents the intensity of overall acquisition activity. The number in each 
entry is the percentage of sample firms acquiring at least one firm in the year. On average, 
about 10.9% of the sample firms acquire at least one firm in a year. The overall acquisition 
activity is volatile over time, peaking at 13-14% in 1996-2000 and plunging to 8% in 2002-
2003 after the internet bubble burst. Columns 4-6 report the intensity of acquisition activity 
by acqusition type. Cross-industry acquisitions are more than two times as popular as cross-
border acquisitions on average, but the activities of the two types of acquisitions vary closely 
to that of the overall. This suggests we should control for time-fixed effects in models for 
investment choices.  
 [Insert Table 1] 
 
4. Empirical results 
Table 2 reports the results of the logit regressions for major investment decisions. In 
column 1, the dependent variable is an indicator for acquisition that equals one if a firm 
acquires at least one firm in year t+1. To address the potential simultaneity issue, all 
explanatory variables are lagged one year relative to the dependent variable, or they are 
                                                            
12
 We check with the source document by Buessing and Soto (2006) at the Center for Retirement Research at 
Boston College, which states that for 1999 and 2000, the information of a significant number of plans is not 
available.   
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measured at year t. The result shows that higher DB-plan coverage is associated with a lower 
propensity of acquisition at a statistical significance of 5%. In terms of the economic 
magnitude, a one-standard-deviation increase in DB_Cover is associated with a 0.062 
reduction in odds ratio for acquisition.13 The signs of other coefficients are consistent with 
previous studies on mergers and acquisitions. Firms with stronger cash flow, higher valuation 
and better past stock returns are more likely to acquire others. Large firms are also more likely 
to be an acquirer than small firms, which probably reflects the fact that large firms have a 
larger capacity to absorb financial risks and stronger capability to raise external funds for 
acquisitions than small firms. On the other hand, asset tangibility is negatively related to the 
propensity of acquisition. A possible explanation is that a high level of tangible assets is 
generally associated with low growth options. Therefore, firms with high asset tangibility tend 
to growth internally rather than via acquisitions.   
In column 2, the dependent variable is an indicator for large capital expenditure that 
equals one if a firm’s capital expenditure-to-assets ratio is above 90th percentile of the sample 
firms in year t+1. The result indicates that higher DB plan coverage is associated with a lower 
propensity of large capital expenditure and the result is statistically significant at 1% level. A 
one-standard-deviation increase in DB_Cover is associated with a 0.244 reduction in odds 
ratio for making large capital expenditure. Consistent with column 1, firms with stronger cash 
flow, higher valuation and better past stock returns are more likely to invest in fixed assets. 
However, as opposed to column 1, large firms are less likely to invest in fixed assets than 
small firms, and asset tangibility is positively associated with the propensity of large fixed-
asset investment. As argued above, smaller firms have weaker ability to absorb risk and raise 
external financing, so they have to rely more on fixed-asset investments for growth. The 
                                                            
13
 In a logit model, the proportional impact of an increase of y for a variable Y on the odds of a positive outcome 
is estimated as exp(α×y) – 1, where α is the coefficient of Y in the model. As the coefficient of DB_Cover in 
model (1) is -0.214, the impact of a one-standard-deviation reduction in DB_Cover on the odds of Acquisition is 
exp(-0.214 × 0.297) – 1 = -0.062. 
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positive correlation between asset tangibility and large capital expenditure is consistent with 
our above argument that high asset tangibility indicates low growth options. 
[Insert Table 2] 
 Table 3 reports the results from multinomial logit regressions for investment decision. 
In particular, it aims to identify the determinants for capital expenditure versus acquisition 
decisions.  The dependent variable is an indicator that equals zero (0) if a firm makes neither 
large capital expenditure nor a merger at t+1, one (1) if a firm makes a large capital 
expenditure no mergers at t+1, and two (2) if a firm completes at least one merger at t+1. 
 Column 1 reports the choices between no major investment (0) and large capital 
expenditure (1). The coefficients are close in magnitudes but in opposite signs to that of 
column 2 of Table 2. As large capital expenditure is the base case, the coefficients reported 
represent the effects of explanatory variables on the propensity of no major investment. 
Therefore, the result is consistent with that of column 2 of Table 2. 
 Column 2 reports the decision between large capital expenditure (1) and acquisition 
(2). The result indicates that higher DB-plan coverage is significantly related with a higher 
propensity of acquisition rather than large capital expenditure. A one-standard-deviation 
increase in DB_Cover is associated with a 0.217 increase in odds ratio for acquisition versus 
large capital expenditure.  Surprisingly, cash flow, firm valuation, and past stock return are all 
negatively linked with the propensity of acquisition versus large capital expenditure. Previous 
studies show that the merger wave is highly correlated with valuation wave because firms 
have strong tendency to issue stock to finance their mergers in high valuation for behavioral 
reasons (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004; Rhodes-Kropf, 
Robinson and Viswanathan, 2005). It turns out that the correlation between capital 
expenditure and valuation overshadows the correlation between acquisition and valuation.  
23 
 
Consistent with Table 2, more tangible assets are related with more capital expenditure and 
fewer acquisitions.  
[Insert Table 3] 
 Table 4, Panel A examines the impact of DB plan coverage on the choices of 
acquisitions. Column 1 reports the multinomial logit regression for the decision between 
cross-border acquisition and domestic acquisition. The dependent variable is an indicator that 
equals zero (0) if a firm does not complete any mergers at t+1, one (1) if a firm completes at 
least one domestic merger but no cross-border merger at t+1, and two (2) if a firm completes 
at least one cross-border merger at t+1. Result for case (2) versus case (1) is reported. It 
indicates that higher DB plan coverage is significantly related with a higher propensity of 
cross-border versus domestic acquisition. A one-standard-deviation increase in DB_Cover is 
associated with a 0.135 increase in odds ratio for cross-border versus domestic acquisition.  
 Column 2 reports the multinomial logit regression for the choice between cross-
industry acquisition (2) and horizontal acquisition (1). The result indicates that higher DB 
plan coverage is associated with a higher propensity of cross-industry versus horizontal 
acquisition, and the result is statistically significant at 5% level. A one-standard-deviation 
increase in DB_Cover is associated with a 0.134 increase in odds ratio for cross-industry 
versus horizontal acquisition. Column 3 combines the cases in columns 1&2 and examines the 
decision between cross-border or cross-industry (i.e. diversifying) acquisition (2) and 
domestic horizontal (i.e. non-diversifying) acquisition (1). The results are qualitative the same 
as those reported in columns 1&2. DB-plan coverage is positively associated with the 
propensity of acquiring foreign firms or firms in other industries. The economic magnitude is 
that a one-standard-deviation increase in DB-plan coverage is associated with an increase of 
0.184 in odds ratio of diversifying acquisition versus non-diversifying acquisition. 
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 Table 4, Panel B examines the impact of DB plan coverage on the type of investment. 
The dependent variable is an indicator that equals zero (0) if a firm does not make any large 
capital expenditure or acquisition at t+1, one (1) if a firm makes a large capital expenditure 
but does not complete an acquisition at t+1, two (2) if a firm completes at least one non-
diversifying acquisition but no diversifying acquisition at t+1, and three (3) if a firm 
completes at least one diversifying acquisition at t+1. 
 Column 1 reports the decision between non-diversifying acquisition (2) and large 
capital expenditure (1), and column 2 reports the decision between diversifying acquisition (2) 
and large capital expenditure (1). The result indicates that DB-plan coverage has a statistically 
insignificant impact on the decision between non-diversifying acquisition and large capital 
expenditure, while it is positively related to the propensity of diversifying acquisition versus 
large capital expenditure. A possible explanation for the difference is that both capital 
expenditure and non-diversifying acquisition are mainly for expanding local production 
facilities. As a result, the choice between the two should not result in a significant difference 
in labour bargaining power and financial risk. On the other hand, a diversifying acquisition 
allows the acquirer to stay further away from labour power in its core business or to diversify 
its financial risk. Therefore, firms with stronger DB-plan coverage are inclined to acquire 
foreign firms or firms in other industries.      
[Insert Table 4] 
Although the results above could suggest that firms stay away from labour power by 
acquiring firms abroad or in other industries, it is also possible that firms maintain DB plans 
in order to gain support from existing employees and labour unions for their investment plans. 
For example, foreseeing weakening bargaining power as a result of diversifying acquisitions, 
existing employees and labour unions may strongly oppose the investments unless they get 
the employers’ guarantee of keeping employees’ benefits untouched. There are two potential 
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ways to gain support from labour unions. First, firms can pre-commit not to reduce employees’ 
benefits after acquisition. Second, firms can invest in countries or industries with strong 
presence of unionized workforce as a signal to respect the collective bargaining rights.     
Tables 5&6 disentangle the bargaining motive from the conforming motive of DB 
plan sponsoring firms who engage in diversifying acquisitions. If firms intentionally reduce 
labour bargaining power by acquiring firms abroad or in other industries, we should observe 
greater benefits accrued to firms where the labour power proxied by DB-plan coverage is 
stronger. This prediction is supported by Rose (1991)’s finding that compared with focused 
firms, diversified firms can endure longer labour strikes and therefore reduce wage 
settlements. Besides, DB plan sponsoring firms would invest mainly in countries or industries 
with weak presence of labour unions, and they are more likely to reduce costs including 
labour costs after acquisition. In contrast, although the conforming view also predicts that DB 
plan sponsoring firms are more likely to invest abroad and other industries to reduce financial 
risks than non-sponsoring firms, it suggests that those firms are more likely invest in countries 
and industries with strong unionized workforce and less likely to reduce labour benefits after 
acquisition.   
Empirically, we regress changes of the performance variables on the indicators of 
major investments. The performance variables include: (1) Δ,, change in earnings 
before interest, taxes and depreciation, scaled by lagged total assets, from t to t+2; (2)	Δ
,,  change in earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation, scaled by net sales, from 
t to t+2; (3) Δ,, where ATO is net sales scaled by lagged total assets; and (4) Δ
_, where Pen_Emp is the pension and retirement expense scaled by number of 
employees (in thousands of dollars). Indicators of major investments include: (1) an indicator 
that equals one if a firm makes a large capital expenditure or non-diversifying acquisition 
(Local); (2) CBI as defined above. We combine large capital expenditure and non-diversifying 
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acquisitions into a group because Table 4 shows that DB_Cover does not affect the choice 
between the two. Besides, we interact the investment indicators with DB_Cover to examine if 
the benefit from a particular type of investment is greater for firms with higher DB plan 
coverage.   
We run the following ordinary least squares (OLS) model regression for the change in 
operating performance: 
∆ !", =  + #"! + $ + %$_& + %$_& ×#"! + %$_& × $ + '( +  ∆'(, +∑ ,, + ∑ ,2, +       (1) 
 
The dependent variable, Δ !",, is one of Δ,, Δ,, Δ,, 
andΔ_,, as defined above. Firm is a vector of firm characteristics including Q, 
Size, Tang, WC and Div as defined in Table 1, in year t. ∆Firm is the change in firm 
characteristics (Firm) from t to t+2. Note that CashFlow is not included because it is highly 
correlated with ROA. We include ∆Firm in the regressions to control for changes in firm 
policies that are unrelated to the investment decisions but affect change in firm performance. 
Nevertheless, we report results with and without ∆Firm in Panel A and Panel B of Table 5. 
Panel A shows that without a major investment, DB plan coverage has a positive and 
significant effect on firm performance. This suggests DB pension plans do not negatively 
affect firm performance. However, large capital expenditures or non-diversifying acquisitions 
negatively affect firms’ performance, especially for firms with high DB-plan coverage 
(column 1) as indicated by the negative coefficient of the interaction term. To further 
investigate change in return on assets (Δ,), we use change in operating profit margin 
(Δ,), change in asset turnover (Δ,), and change in fixed asset to employee 
ratio (Δ_,) as dependent variables in columns 2, 3 and 4 respectively.14 The 
                                                            
14
 Notice that ROA = OM × ATO. 
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regression results show that the operating profit margin declines and pension expense per 
employee increases after such investments for firms with higher DB plan coverage. Therefore, 
large capital expenditures and non-diversifying acquisitions seem to destroy value for DB 
plan sponsoring firms by reducing their ability to cut costs. The finding is consistent with the 
bargaining motive of DB plan sponsoring firms. The new investments in local and existing 
businesses expose more firm assets to unionized workforce, making firms difficult to improve 
profitability by reducing costs. As a result, DB plan sponsoring firms tend to avoid investing 
in existing businesses locally.  
While diversifying acquisitions also result in worse operating profitability (column 1), 
the effect is less negative for firms with higher DB-plan coverage. The finding suggests that 
diversifying acquisitions create more value for DB plan sponsoring firms than non-sponsoring 
firms. Columns 2, 3 and 4 show that the relative outperformance of DB plan sponsoring firms 
is mainly due to an improvement in asset turnover. On the other hand, there is no indication 
that those firms reduce operating expense after investing abroad or other industries, as 
suggested by insignificant coefficients of the interaction term in regressions for Δ, 
and Δ_,. Therefore, cutting costs is unlikely to be a major motivation for DB 
plan sponsoring firms to invest abroad or in new industries, which is inconsistent with the 
bargaining motive but consistent with the conforming motive.  
In Panel B, we include ∆Firm in the model. The main results are qualitatively the 
same as those in Panel A, except that the interaction term Local×DB_Cover becomes 
statistically insignificant in the regression for Δ_,.  
 [Insert Table 5] 
Table 6 examines the target location of diversifying acquisition and target industry in 
diversifying acquisition. The bargaining motive suggests DB plan sponsoring firms invest in 
countries or industries with weak unionized workforce while the conforming motive suggests 
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the opposite. To test the two predictions, we first identify the union power of target country in 
each cross-border acquisition and that of target industry in each domestic diversifying 
acquisition. To gauge country-level union power, we obtain the collective relations law index 
developed by Botero et al. (2004), a composite index of eighteen indicators that measure 
labour union power and the rights of collective disputes. Industry union power is gauged by 
the industry unionization rate provided by Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson. Then for 
each firm-year, we calculate the average collective relations law index for target countries of 
all cross-border acquisitions (Avg_cUnion) and the average unionization rate for target 
industries of all domestic diversifying acquisitions (Avg_iUnion) done by the firm, if any. 
We run the following OLS regressions for Avg_cUnion (column 1) and Avg_iUnion 
(column 2): 
&*_"+(	
	&*_(+( = , + ,%$_& + ,!-ℎ' + ,. +,(/ + ,!* + ,0 + ,%(& + ,1 +∑ ,,, + ∑ ,,2, +      (2) 
 
By construction, for column 1, only firms that acquire at least on foreign firm in a year are 
considered, while for column 2, only firms that make at least one domestic diversifying 
acquisition in a year are considered. As a result, the numbers of observations are much lower 
than those for previous tables.  
The regression results suggest that firms with higher DB plan coverage generally 
prefer investing in countries or industries with stronger unionized workforce, as indicated by 
the positive coefficients of DB_Cover in both regressions. The finding is in line with the 
conformity motive of DB plan sponsoring firms who consider employees’ benefits and 
concerns in their investment decisions. However, it is inconsistent with the bargaining motive 
that predicts firms to strategically reallocate their capital to areas outside the scrutiny by 
labour unions.   
[Insert Table 6] 
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In sum, the results in Tables 5&6 show that DB plan sponsoring firms experience an 
improvement in operating profitability relative to non-sponsoring firms after diversifying 
acquisitions. However, such improvement is not due to cost cutting or reduction in pension 
expense but an improvement in asset turnover. Further analysis shows that in cross-border or 
domestic diversifying acquisitions, DB plan sponsoring firms tend to invest in countries or 
industries with strong union power. All these findings are consistent with the conforming 
motive but against the bargaining motive of firms in their investment decisions. At the same 
time, we do find some supporting evidences for the bargaining motive of DB plan sponsoring 
firms in their capital expenditure and non-diversifying acquisition decisions. After those 
investments, DB plan sponsoring firms experience a reduction in operating profitability and 
an increase in pension expense relative to non-sponsoring firms. The finding can explain why 
DB plan sponsoring firms tend to under-invest in existing businesses especially in the 
domestic market.  
  
5. Further discussions and robustness checks 
5.1. Relation with other studies in cross-border acquisitions and additional controls for 
investment choice 
Previous studies for cross-border mergers have identified country-levels and industry-
level factors that are not included in our baseline models in Table 4. Many studies suggest 
that a spill-over of good governance standards from the bidder to the target creates value. For 
example, Rossi and Volpin (2004) finds that countries with better accounting standards and 
stronger shareholder protection have more M&A activities, and that cross-border mergers are 
mostly initiated by firms in countries with better investor protection to acquire firms in 
countries with weaker investor protection. Martynova and Renneboog (2008) show that 
takeover returns are positively related to the difference between the bidder and target country-
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level corporate governance. Bris, Brisley and Cabolis (2008) find that industry valuation 
increases when firms in the industry are acquired by firms in other countries with better 
investor protection and accounting standards. Bris and Cabolis (2008) find that bidders from 
countries with better shareholder protection and accounting standards pay a higher merger 
premium in cross-border mergers relative to matching domestic mergers. Lel and Miller (2015) 
document that after a country passes a takeover law, poorly performing firms experience a 
higher probability of being taken over. 
  Taxation is another consideration when firms choose between domestic and cross-
border acquisitions. Scholes and Wolfson (1990) show that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 that 
discourages tax-induced M&A activity reduces domestic M&A activity but increases the 
demand for foreign acquisitions. Huizinga and Voget (2009) show that double taxation of 
foreign subsidiaries’ income reduces the incentives to acquire foreign firms. Erel, Liao and 
Weisbach (2012) find that cross-border mergers are likely to happen if the tax rate in the 
bidder’s country is higher than that of the target’s country. Geographic and cultural distances 
also affect M&A activity between two countries. Erel, Liao and Weisbach (2012) show cross-
border mergers are more likely to happen between two countries if the two countries are 
geographically close to each other and they have more bilateral trades. Ahern, Daminelli and 
Fracassi (2015) show that M&A activity between two countries is more intensive if they are 
culturally close in terms of trust, hierarchy and individualism. Besides, greater distances in 
trust and individualism result in lower combined merger announcement returns. 
 However, as our study assesses US firms’ investment decisions, we cannot include 
those country-level factors in our analysis. Instead, we create several industry-level or firm-
level substitutes to address some of those issues. First, we control for cross-border trades at 
industry-level. We collect import and export values at Harmonized System (HS) level from 
Peter Schott’s website in 1990-2012, aggregate the HS product-level values into industry-
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level levels, and calculate the industry’s share of import (export) in a year as its import 
(export) value divided by the total import (export) value of all industries in the year.15 We 
expect an industry’s demand for cross-border acquisitions are correlated with its international 
trade volume.  
Second, we collect firm-level after-interest marginal tax rates by Blouin, Core and 
Guay (2010). Foley et al. (2007) document that many firms hold excess cash abroad because 
of facing high repatriation taxes on their foreign incomes. Therefore, we expect firms facing 
higher marginal tax rates on their incomes to be more likely to explore foreign opportunities 
for reducing their tax expenses.  
Third, we include the yearly intensity of cross-border (diversifying) acquisitions at 
industry level, defined as the number of cross-border (diversifying) acquisitions divided by 
the total number of acquisitions in the industry. The two variables control for unknown 
industry factors that drive the differences in cross-border and diversifying acquisitions across 
industries. Besides, Clougherty et al. (2014) theoretically and empirically show that more 
cross-border mergers in a highly unionized industry, particularly those involve firms in same 
industry, result in lower wages for rival firms. Therefore, we include the variables in both the 
choice model and the models for changes in pension expense and operating performance.  
Fourth, we include institutional ownership to account for the degree of institutional 
monitoring. Ferreira, Massa and Matos (2010) find that foreign institutional ownership 
increases the completion rate of cross-border acquisition and they argue that foreign 
institutions help reduce the information asymmetry between bidders and targets. As US 
institutions are supposed to be sophisticated in collecting and processing information, we 
expect that a higher level of institutional ownership should increase a firm’s probability to 
acquire a foreign firm. However, previous studies also suggest that short-termism of 
                                                            
15
 The data is available at http://faculty.som.yale.edu/peterschott/sub_international.htm and it is funded by Yale 
Social Sciences Library. We thank Peter Schott to make it available free for academic use. See Pierce and Schott 
(2012) for detailed documentation of concordance between HS System codes and SIC/NAICS codes. 
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institutional investors lead to managerial short-termism, resulting in distorted corporate 
decisions. For example, Bushee (1998) finds that short-term institutional holding causes 
corporate managers to engage less in research and development that provides long-term 
benefits but results in short-term downward pressure on earnings. Gaspar, Massa and Matos 
(2005) find that target firms with short-term institutional investors are likely to get lower 
premiums. They attribute the finding to weak monitoring from short-term investors that allow 
managers to seek private benefits rather than maximize proceeds from acquisitions. Similarly, 
Chen, Harford and Li (2007) find that independent long-term institutional holding is 
positively related to post-merger stock performance and operating performance. To calculate 
short-term and long-term institutional holdings, we base on investor classification by Brian 
Bushee to classify institutional investors into dedicated investors, quasi-indexers, and 
transient investors. 16  We then obtain institutional holding data from Thomson Reuters 
Institutional (13f) Holdings. Dedicated (Transient) ownership for each quarter is the number 
of shares held by dedicated (transient) investors divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding at the end of quarter. We then average the quarterly measures into annual ones.  
Finally, we include pension deficits, defined as pension benefit obligation minus fair 
value of pension plan assets, scaled by lagged total assets. Previous studies (Rauh, 2006; 
Chang, Kang and Zhang, 2012; Cocco and Volpin, 2013) show that pension deficits 
significantly affect investment decisions.   
Table 7 reports the result from multinomial model for investment choices with 
additional controls. The model is specified similarly to that for Panel B of Table 4. As the 
import/export data is available up to 2012 only and some of the variables have missing values 
for some firms or industries, the numbers of observations are lower than those reported in 
Table 4. The result indicates that after controlling for industry’s international trading activity, 
                                                            
16
 The classification data is available at http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html. We thank 
Brian Bushee to make the data available free for academic use.  
33 
 
cross-border and diversifying acquisition activity as well as firm’s tax rate and institutional 
ownership, DB plan coverage is still negatively related to the propensity of making a major 
investment (column 1). Besides, conditional to a major investment, firms are more likely to 
acquire firms abroad or in other industries than to invest in fixed assets or acquire a domestic 
firm in same industry (columns 2&3). Therefore, our main results in Table 4 are robust to the 
presence of additional controls.   
[Insert Table 7] 
 
5.2. Endogeneity of DB plan coverage 
 This subsection aims to account for endogeneity concerns in regressions for change in 
operating performance. In Table 5, we examine change in performance rather than the level of 
performance, which can eliminate omitted time-invariant firm characteristics that could cause 
a spurious relation between DB plan coverage and firm performance. However, some time-
varying omitted firm or industry characteristics may still simultaneously affect DB plan 
coverage and firm performance. For example, technological development may affect a firm’s 
relationship with labour unions as well as its investment opportunity set. While a firm’s 
technological development can enlarge its investment opportunities by allowing it to expand 
its production capacity, it may also reduce its reliance on labour forces and its incentives to 
provide DB pension plans to retain workers. Similar effects exist when trade agreements are 
set up to reduce barriers for trading. Trade liberalization provides more economic motivations 
for cross-border investments but they also affect firms’ incentives to retain workers and 
reduce the power of labour unions. Without controlling those unobserved firm-specific or 
market-wide heterogeneous factors, the estimation results might be biased and inconsistent.  
To address the endogeneity concern for the relationship between DB plan coverage 
and change in operating performance after major investments, we re-run models for Table 5 
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Panel B using instrumental variable (IV) regressions. We further add firm fixed effects to the 
regressions to control for omitted time-invariant firm characteristics that could cause a 
spurious relation between DB plan coverage and firm performance. Adding firm fixed effects 
to the regressions can also control for firm-specific factors that affect the investment choices, 
as Table 4 shows that firms making one form of investment may be fundamentally different 
from firms making another form of investment.  
  We perform the IV regressions with following instruments: (1) the industry 
unionization rate; (2) the 5-year lagged value of the natural logarithm pension and 
postretirement expenses per employee, which is motivated by Bae, Kang and Wang (2011) 
who use it as an instrument for employee treatment index; and (3) the 5-year lagged value of 
the natural logarithm of number of employees. We expect lagged values of labour related 
variables are good instruments for current DB plan coverage for the following reason. 
Although a firm’s investment decision could be affected by its existing labour policies, it is 
much less likely that it could be affected by its labour policies long time ago. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that a firm’s labour policies long time ago affect its current investment decision 
beyond the correlation between past and current pension policies. The industry unionization 
rate is used as an instrument because labour unions are found to be associated with DB 
pension plans and many DB plans were collectively bargained when labour unions were 
strong. It is the most widely used proxy for labour bargaining power in previous studies (e.g. 
Klasa, Maxwell and Ortiz-Molina, 2009; Matsa, 2010; Shivdasani and Stefanescu, 2010; 
Chang, Kang and Zhang, 2012). Simple correlation analysis shows that the correlations 
between DB_cover and those instrumental variables are between 0.05 and 0.44 and significant 
at 1% level. 
Table 8 report the IV regression results for change in performance with DB plan 
coverage and its interaction with indicator for cross-border or diversifying acquisitions 
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instrumented. The instruments include those listed above and their interaction with Local and 
CBI. The J-statistics of all models except the last column are statistically insignificant, 
suggesting that our IV models are well-specified. The IV regression results are generally 
consistent with those of the OLS regressions, except that the coefficients of Local×DB_Cover 
are still negative but insignificant for the regressions of Δ, and Δ,, while the 
coefficients of Local×DB_Cover and CBI×DB_Cover become statistically significant for the 
regression of Δ_,.17  
 [Insert Table 8] 
 
6. Conclusion 
Using a sample of 27,883 firm-years, we examine the US manufacturing firms in 
1990-2013 and find that DB-plan coverage is negatively associated with the propensity of 
making a major investment defined as a large capital expenditure or an acquisition of firm. 
However, subject to a major investment decision, a firm with higher DB-plan coverage is 
more likely to acquire other firms than to invest in fixed assets. More interestingly, we find 
that among acquisitions, a firm with high DB-plan coverage prefers diversifying acquisitions 
(cross-border or cross-industry) to non-diversifying (domestic horizontal) acquisitions or 
capital expenditures. The findings are consistent with both the bargaining motive and 
conforming motive of investments for DB plan offering firms. However, further evidence 
shows that although firms with higher DB-plan coverage experience a greater improvement in 
operating profitability and asset turnover after diversifying acquisitions. Besides, in those 
                                                            
17 A potential concern for using industry unionization rate as an instrument is that industry unionization rate is 
found to be correlated with corporate financing decisions (Matsa, 2010) and cash holding (Klasa, Maxwell and 
Ortiz-Molina, 2009) by previous studies. It is possible that industry unionization rate also affects change in 
operating performance directly rather than via DB plan coverage. In an unreported test, we re-run regressions for 
Table 5 Panel B with industry unionization rate and firm-fixed effects. We found that industry unionization rate 
is uncorrelated with Δ
,
, Δ
,
 and Δ
,
, but it is negatively correlated with Δ_	

,
. In 
other words, industry unionization rate fulfills the exclusion restriction for regressions for Δ
,
, Δ
,
 
and Δ
,
.  
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investments, they tend to invest in countries or industries with stronger unionized workforce. 
Therefore, their investments are likely to be driven by the conforming motive rather than the 
bargaining motive. In contrast, firms with higher DB-plan coverage experience a greater 
reduction in operating profitability and profit margin after large capital expenditures or non-
diversifying acquisitions and an increase in pension expense. The finding suggests that cost 
cutting is difficult after investing in existing businesses especially when existing employees 
are strongly unionized. As a result, firms tend to under-invest in existing businesses to avoid 
more assets being exposed to labour bargaining.  
Our results suggest that DB plan sponsoring firms have multiple considerations in 
their investment decisions. On one hand, most of their employees are unionized and have 
strong ability and incentives to bargain. As suggested by theoretical predictions from previous 
studies (Lommerud, Straume and Sorgard, 2003, 2006; Eckel and Egger, 2009), when firms 
face strong labour bargaining power, they may under-invest or prefer investing in areas less 
subject to labour scrutiny. On the other hand, they have to respect and accept the presence of 
labour unions in order to gain their supports for major decisions. They signal their acceptance 
of unionized workforce by investing in countries or industries with strong unionized 
workforce. Our findings on their choices of location and industry in cross-border acquisitions 
and cross-industry acquisitions support this view.  
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Table 1 Distribution of sample and summary statistics of key variables  
 
The sample consists of all manufacturing firms (SIC 2000-3999) that files IRS Form 5500 for their eligible pension plans with over 100 participants and are 
covered by CRSP/Compustat Merged Database from 1990 to 2013. Firms with missing variables for key regressions are also excluded. 
 
Panel A reports the sample distribution, and summary statistics for DB-plan coverage (DB_Cover) and variables for major investment decisions. Mean values 
by year and overall are reported. DB_Cover is the ratio of DB-plan assets to total pension-plan assets based on information in IRS Form 5000 filings. Acquire 
equals one if a firm acquires at least one firm in the year. CrossBorder equals one if a firm acquires at least one firm outside the United States in the year, 
CrossIndustry equals one if a firm acquires at least one firm in other industry, i.e. belonging to a different 4-digit SIC code, and CBI equals one if 
CrossBorder equals one or CrossIndustry equals one. 
 
Panel B reports the summary statistics for explanatory variables. DB_Cover is defined above. CashFlow is the sum of net income and depreciation minus 
dividends, divided by lagged total assets. Q is the market-to-book ratio of assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets in 2005 constant value. Tang is net 
property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets. WC is net working capital less cash, divided by total assets. Div is cash dividend divided by lagged total 
assets. CumRet is the 12-month cumulative stock return in fiscal year. Δ, is change in earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation, scaled by 
lagged total assets, from t to t+2;	Δ, is change in earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation, scaled by net sales, Δ, is the change in net 
sales scaled by lagged total assets from t to t+2; and Δ	_
, is the change in pension and post-retirement expense per employees (in thousands 
dollars) from t to t+2. The variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles of respective distributions.  
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Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Year N DB_Cover Acquire CrossBorder CrossIndustry CBI 
1990 1,071 0.306     
1991 1,092 0.307 0.047 0.008 0.036 0.038 
1992 1,139 0.276 0.069 0.016 0.052 0.055 
1993 1,222 0.255 0.084 0.021 0.061 0.070 
1994 1,364 0.241 0.087 0.024 0.068 0.074 
1995 1,441 0.225 0.122 0.037 0.090 0.102 
1996 1,472 0.211 0.133 0.040 0.099 0.109 
1997 1,466 0.197 0.135 0.041 0.101 0.111 
1998 1,405 0.193 0.141 0.052 0.107 0.116 
1999 1,062 0.197 0.143 0.038 0.107 0.116 
2000 1,079 0.182 0.142 0.039 0.102 0.106 
2001 1,263 0.160 0.115 0.026 0.082 0.090 
2002 1,231 0.155 0.080 0.021 0.057 0.063 
2003 1,234 0.162 0.079 0.018 0.057 0.060 
2004 1,158 0.149 0.121 0.043 0.088 0.100 
2005 1,161 0.164 0.113 0.036 0.076 0.090 
2006 1,103 0.148 0.120 0.044 0.086 0.099 
2007 1,079 0.145 0.135 0.046 0.091 0.101 
2008 1,095 0.152 0.105 0.034 0.074 0.082 
2009 1,011 0.146 0.073 0.022 0.045 0.051 
2010 977 0.162 0.110 0.051 0.075 0.093 
2011 946 0.169 0.113 0.046 0.089 0.098 
2012 922 0.165 0.101 0.035 0.071 0.081 
2013 890 0.161 0.098 0.041 0.067 0.081 
2014   0.113 0.044 0.081 0.093 
Total 27,883 0.194 0.109 0.034 0.079 0.088 
 
  
43 
 
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard deviation N 
DB_Cover 0.194 0 0 1 0.297 27,883 
CashFlow 0.059 0.091 -0.704 0.399 0.170 27,883 
Q 1.898 1.466 0.584 8.292 1.339 27,883 
Size 5.956 5.769 2.677 10.584 1.804 27,883 
Tang 0.241 0.209 0.015 0.717 0.158 27,883 
WC 0.145 0.141 -0.318 0.553 0.163 27,883 
Div 0.011 0 0 0.107 0.019 27,883 
CumRet 0.167 0.066 -0.809 3.179 0.634 27,883 
Δ, -0.008 -0.004 -0.472 0.437 0.129 25,185 
Δ, 0.006 0.002 -2.145 2.421 0.391 25,077 
Δ, -0.033 -0.010 -1.460 1.200 0.403 25,115 
Δ	_
, 0.186 0.047 -4.181 6.437 1.301 20,853 
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Table 2 DB plans and major investment decision 
 
	
 = 1 =Ψ( + 	_ + ℎ +  +  +  +
	 + 
	 + 
 + ∑ , !
, + ∑ ,2, )             
 
The dependent variable is an indicator for major investment decision at t+1. In column 1, the indicator 
equals one if a firm completes at least one acquisition at t+1. In column 2, the indicator equals one if 
capital expenditure-to-assets ratio in year t+1 is above 90th percentile of sample firms in the year. The 
explanatory variables include DB_Cover, CashFlow, Q, Size, Tang, WC, Div, and CumRet. All 
explanatory variables are defined in Table 1 and are measured as of time t.  
 
Regressions are estimated with logit. Ψ is the logistic transformation of the linear combination of the 
explanatory variables. Therefore, the probability that firm k makes major investment in year t+1 is 
modelled as, 
 
	
 = 1| = 	(
′)
	(
′)	
. 
 
where  is a set of explanatory variables for firm k at year t as defined above, and β is the set of 
estimated coefficients of the model. Year fixed effects and 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects are added 
but not reported. The standard errors are reported in the parentheses. *,**,*** represent 10%, 5% and 
1% significant levels respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
Indicator Acquisition Large capital expenditure 
DB_Cover -0.214** -0.942*** 
 (0.095) (0.146) 
CashFlow 1.432*** 2.788*** 
 (0.210) (0.288) 
Q 0.098*** 0.382*** 
 (0.019) (0.023) 
Size 0.408*** -0.125*** 
 (0.018) (0.027) 
Tang -1.709*** 6.802*** 
 (0.215) (0.250) 
WC 0.051 -0.190 
 (0.183) (0.267) 
Div -1.426 -8.242*** 
 (1.357) (1.871) 
CumRet  0.127*** 0.272*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-sq 0.098 0.198 
N 27,883 27,883 
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Table 3 DB plans and the choice between capital expenditure and mergers 
 
The dependent variable is an indicator (InvType) that equals zero (0) if a firm neither makes large 
capital expenditure nor completes an acquisition at t+1, one (1) if a firm makes a large capital 
expenditure but does not complete an acquisition at t+1, and two (2) if a firm completes at least one 
acquisition at t+1. A capital expenditure is large if the capital expenditure-to-assets ratio is above 90th 
percentile of the sample firms in the year.  
 
All explanatory variables are measured as of time t. Regression models are estimated with multinomial 
logit, with case (1) as the base case. The probability that firm k choose j in year t+1 is modelled as, 
 
#$ = %| = 	(
′)
∑ 	(
′)
, where j = 0, 1, 2. 
 
 is a set of explanatory variables for firm k at year t, which include DB_Cover, CashFlow, Q, Size, 
Tang, WC, Div, and CumRet, as defined in Table 1. & is the set of estimated coefficients for choice j. 
As case (1) is the base case, the set of coefficients & are set to zeros. 
 
Result for case (0) versus case (1) is reported in column 1, result for case (2) versus case (1) is 
reported in column 2. Year fixed effects and 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects are added but not 
reported. The standard errors are reported in the parentheses. *,**,*** represent 10%, 5% and 1% 
significant levels respectively. 
 
 (1) 
No major investment (0) vs  
large CAPX (1, base) 
(2) 
Acquisition (2) vs  
large CAPX (1, base) 
DB_Cover 0.959*** 0.661*** 
 (0.149) (0.168) 
CashFlow -2.775*** -1.071*** 
 (0.293) (0.340) 
Q -0.389*** -0.232*** 
 (0.024) (0.026) 
Size 0.122*** 0.518*** 
 (0.028) (0.032) 
Tang -6.626*** -7.555*** 
 (0.248) (0.302) 
WC 0.278 0.267 
 (0.273) (0.305) 
Div 7.053*** 4.332** 
 (1.874) (2.151) 
CumRet  -0.273*** -0.106** 
 (0.036) (0.047) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-sq 0.143 
N 27,883 
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Table 4 DB plans and type of acquisition  
 
Panel A reports the multinomial logit regressions for the choice between different types of acquisition. 
In column 1, the dependent variable is an indicator that equals zero (0) if a firm does not complete an 
acquisition at t+1, one (1) if a firm completes at least one domestic acquisition but no cross-border 
acquisition at t+1, and two (2) if a firm completes at least one cross-border acquisition at t+1. In 
column 2, the dependent variable is an indicator that equals zero (0) if a firm does not complete an 
acquisition at t+1, one (1) if a firm completes at least one horizontal acquisition but no cross-industry 
acquisition at t+1, and two (2) if a firm completes at least one cross-industry acquisition at t+1. In 
column 3, the dependent variable is an indicator that equals zero (0) if a firm does not complete an 
acquisition at t+1, one (1) if a firm completes at least one domestic horizontal (i.e. non-diversifying) 
acquisition but no cross-border or cross-industry (i.e. diversifying) acquisition at t+1, and two (2) if a 
firm completes at least one cross-border or cross-industry acquisition at t+1. Case (1) as the base case. 
Result for case (2) versus case (1) is reported. 
 
Panel B reports the multinomial logit regression for the choice between large capital expenditure and 
different types of acquisition. The dependent variable is an indicator that equals zero (0) if a firm 
neither makes large capital expenditure nor completes an acquisition at t+1, one (1) if a firm makes a 
large capital expenditure but does not complete an acquisition at t+1, two (2) if a firm completes at 
least one non-diversifying acquisition but no diversifying acquisition at t+1, and three (3) if a firm 
completes at least one diversifying acquisition at t+1. Case (1) as the base case. Result for case (2) 
versus case (1) is reported in column 1 and result for case (3) versus case (1) is reported in column 2.  
 
The explanatory variables include DB_Cover, CashFlow, Q, Size, Tang, WC, Div, and CumRet. All 
explanatory variables are defined in Table 1 and are measured as of time t. Year fixed effects and 2-
digit SIC industry fixed effects are added but not reported. The standard errors are reported in the 
parentheses. *,**,*** represent 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels respectively. 
 
Panel A  
 
(1) 
Cross-border (2) vs 
Domestic (1, base) 
(2) 
Cross-industry (2) vs 
Horizontal (1, base) 
(3) 
Diversifying (2) vs 
Non-diversifying (1, 
base) 
DB_Cover 0.425** 0.424** 0.568** 
 (0.171) (0.192) (0.230) 
CashFlow -0.292 0.202 0.190 
 (0.405) (0.378) (0.416) 
Q 0.003 -0.008 -0.015 
 (0.035) (0.033) (0.034) 
Size 0.208*** 0.089*** 0.139*** 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.034) 
Tang 1.018** -1.082*** -1.002** 
 (0.419) (0.412) (0.457) 
WC 1.201*** 0.963*** 1.167*** 
 (0.348) (0.355) (0.379) 
Div -1.768 2.201 3.537 
 (2.564) (3.005) (3.109) 
CumRet  0.137** 0.010 0.046 
 (0.069) (0.072) (0.082) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-sq 0.093 0.089 0.094 
N 27,883 27,883 27,883 
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Panel B  (1)  
Non-diversifying (2) vs large 
CAPX (1, base) 
(2)  
Diversifying (3) vs large 
CAPX (1, base) 
DB_Cover 0.179 0.762*** 
 (0.251) (0.174) 
CashFlow -1.123** -0.986*** 
 (0.460) (0.357) 
Q -0.218*** -0.239*** 
 (0.035) (0.028) 
Size 0.407*** 0.548*** 
 (0.042) (0.033) 
Tang -6.655*** -7.791*** 
 (0.493) (0.312) 
WC -0.661 0.530* 
 (0.429) (0.314) 
Div 1.333 5.102** 
 (3.386) (2.215) 
CumRet  -0.136* -0.097** 
 (0.081) (0.049) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-sq 0.136 
27,883 N 
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Table 5 The Effects of large capital expenditures and domestic horizontal acquisitions on 
operating performance  
 
∆	, = 
 + 
	 + 
 + 
_ + 
_ ×
	 + 
_ ×  + 
	 + 
	 ∆, +
∑ 

,, + ∑ 
,2, +        
 
The dependent variable, ∆	,, is one of the following variables. Δ, is 
change in earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation, scaled by lagged total assets, from t to 
t+2;	Δ, is change in earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation, scaled by net sales, 
from t to t+2; ∆,	is the change in net sales scaled by lagged total assets from t to t+2; and 
∆_ !, is the change in pension and retirement expense scaled by number of employees 
(in thousands of dollars per employee).  
 
Regressions are estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS) method. Local is an indicator for 
large capital expenditure or non-diversifying acquisition, and CBI is an indicator for diversifying 
acquisition. Firm is a vector of firm characteristics including Q, Size, Tang, WC and Div as 
defined in Table 1, in year t. ∆Firm is the change in Firm from t to t+2. Year fixed effects and 2-
digit SIC industry fixed effects are added but not reported. The standard errors are reported in the 
parentheses. *,**,*** represent 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels respectively. 
 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆_ ! 
Local  -0.017*** 0.005 -0.108*** 0.028 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.027) 
CBI -0.013*** -0.005 -0.048*** -0.134*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.012) (0.033) 
DB_Cover 0.010*** 0.012** 0.013 0.164*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.009) (0.042) 
Local×DB_Cover -0.016** -0.034** -0.031 0.208* 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.028) (0.120) 
CBI×DB_Cover 0.017** 0.013 0.070*** -0.175 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.026) (0.120) 
Q -0.003*** 0.015*** -0.023*** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) 
Size -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.021*** 0.041*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) 
Tang 0.058*** 0.055** 0.204*** -0.071 
 (0.007) (0.024) (0.020) (0.081) 
WC -0.075*** -0.133*** -0.263*** 0.083 
 (0.007) (0.025) (0.020) (0.064) 
Div -0.071 -0.390*** -0.066 0.733 
 (0.049) (0.139) (0.148) (0.522) 
CumRet  -0.011*** -0.034*** -0.080*** 0.023 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.015) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 
N 25,185 25,077 25,115 20,853 
 
  
49 
 
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆_ ! 
Local  -0.023*** -0.004 -0.124*** 0.101*** 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.010) (0.030) 
CBI -0.026*** -0.015 -0.068*** -0.108*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.012) (0.034) 
DB_Cover 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.024*** 0.168*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.009) (0.042) 
Local×DB_Cover -0.012* -0.031** -0.025 0.188 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.028) (0.121) 
CBI×DB_Cover 0.023*** 0.019 0.078*** -0.194 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.026) (0.120) 
∆Q 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.090*** -0.021** 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.009) 
∆Size 0.074*** 0.062*** 0.149*** -0.178*** 
 (0.004) (0.013) (0.010) (0.033) 
∆Tang -0.132*** -0.023 -0.071 -0.823*** 
 (0.017) (0.070) (0.051) (0.204) 
∆WC 0.130*** 0.156*** 0.302*** -0.186** 
 (0.010) (0.036) (0.027) (0.078) 
∆Div -0.078 -0.074 0.040 0.265 
 (0.048) (0.156) (0.102) (0.253) 
Q 0.002 0.023*** -0.002 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.009) 
Size -0.002*** -0.005** -0.018*** 0.040*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) 
Tang 0.037*** 0.049* 0.200*** -0.200** 
 (0.007) (0.025) (0.020) (0.086) 
WC -0.037*** -0.086*** -0.148*** 0.055 
 (0.007) (0.027) (0.021) (0.067) 
Div -0.161*** -0.515*** -0.243 0.886* 
 (0.050) (0.155) (0.149) (0.525) 
CumRet  -0.013*** -0.035*** -0.076*** 0.036** 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.016) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq 0.16 0.02 0.17 0.05 
N 24,488 24,388 24,400 20,783 
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Table 6 Choice of locations in cross-border acquisitions and industries in diversifying 
acquisitions 
 
"_	#	$	"_#% = & + &_ + &'ℎ( + &) +
&* + &" + &+ + & + &, +
∑ &
,, + ∑ &,2, +          
 
The dependent variables are average collective relations law index of target countries 
(Avg_cUnion, column 1) and average industry unionization rate (Avg_iUnion, column 2). The 
collective relations law index is provided by Botero et al. (2004) and the industry unionization 
rate is provided by Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson. For each firm-year, we calculate the 
average collective relations law index for target countries of all cross-border acquisitions and the 
average unionization rate for target industries of all cross-industry acquisitions, if any. Other 
explanatory variables are defined in Table 1 and measured as of time t.  
 
Regressions are estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS) model. For column 1, only firms that 
acquire foreign firms are included, and for column 2, only firms that make cross-industry 
acquisitions in the domestic market. Year fixed effects and 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects are 
added but not reported. The standard errors are reported in the parentheses. *,**,*** represent 
10%, 5% and 1% significant levels respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Avg_cUnion Avg_iUnion 
DB_Cover 0.051** 0.025*** 
 (0.023) (0.009) 
CashFlow -0.016 -0.010 
 (0.054) (0.019) 
Q 0.005 -0.004*** 
 (0.005) (0.001) 
Size 0.006 -0.002* 
 (0.004) (0.001) 
Tang 0.103** 0.111*** 
 (0.050) (0.021) 
WC 0.012 0.011 
 (0.056) (0.018) 
Div 0.289 -0.118 
 (0.363) (0.106) 
CumRet  -0.009 0.003 
 (0.012) (0.003) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq 0.04 0.22 
N 951 1,629 
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Table 7 Robustness check: DB plan coverage and investment choice 
 
The table reports the multinomial logit regression for the choice between large capital 
expenditure and different types of acquisitions. Industry’s share of import (export) is defined as 
its import (export) value divided by the total import (export) value. After-interest marginal tax 
rate comes from Blouin, Core and Guay (2010). Intensity of cross-border (cross-industry) 
acquisitions is the number of cross-border (cross-industry) acquisitions divided by the total 
number of acquisitions in the industry. Dedicated (Transient) ownership is the number of shares 
held by dedicated (transient) investors divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Pension 
deficits is pension benefit obligation minus fair value of pension plan assets, scaled by lagged 
total assets. A firm’s pension deficits is set to be zero if it has no pension data reported by 
Compustat. DB_Cover, CashFlow, Q, Size, Tang, WC, Div, and CumRet are defined in Table 1 
and are measured as of time t. Year fixed effects and 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects are added 
but not reported. The standard errors are reported in the parentheses. *,**,*** represent 10%, 5% 
and 1% significant levels respectively. 
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Investment choice  
(1) 
No major investment 
(0) vs  
large CAPX (1, base) 
(2)  
Non-diversifying (2) 
vs large CAPX (1, 
base) 
(3)  
Diversifying (3) vs 
large CAPX (1, base) 
DB_Cover 0.874*** 0.285 0.765*** 
 (0.158) (0.268) (0.184) 
CashFlow -1.880*** -1.007* -0.607 
 (0.316) (0.515) (0.399) 
Q -0.351*** -0.211*** -0.202*** 
 (0.025) (0.038) (0.031) 
Size 0.214*** 0.442*** 0.617*** 
 (0.036) (0.053) (0.042) 
Tang -6.831*** -7.068*** -8.008*** 
 (0.261) (0.533) (0.337) 
WC 0.342 -0.404 0.472 
 (0.307) (0.481) (0.351) 
Div 4.896** 1.012 3.474 
 (2.019) (3.666) (2.508) 
CumRet  -0.285*** -0.199** -0.115** 
 (0.039) (0.086) (0.053) 
Pension deficits 0.413 -1.352 0.316 
 (0.839) (1.335) (1.033) 
Industry’s share of import -4.433 -16.014* -0.210 
 (4.480) (9.487) (5.083) 
Industry’s share of export -9.212** 19.818** -11.253** 
 (4.493) (7.929) (5.036) 
After-interest marginal  -1.900*** -0.102 -0.840 
  tax rate (0.454) (0.817) (0.586) 
Intensity of cross-border 0.652*** 0.138 0.996*** 
  acquisitions (0.246) (0.519) (0.313) 
Intensity of cross-industry -0.220 -1.487*** 0.238 
  acquisitions (0.188) (0.355) (0.272) 
Dedicated ownership 0.067 -0.019 -0.954* 
 (0.426) (0.774) (0.533) 
Transient ownership -2.127*** -0.430 -1.048** 
 (0.362) (0.599) (0.464) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-sq 0.144 
N 24,364 
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Table 8 Robustness check: Instrumental variable model for change in operating 
performance  
 
A two-stage firm fixed-effects model is estimated for change in performance from year t to t+2. 
In first stage _ , _ × 	 , and _ ×   are respectively 
regressed on (1) industry unionization rate, (2) the 5-year lagged value of pension and 
postretirement expenses per employee, (3) the 5-year lagged value of the natural logarithm of 
number of employees, and their interaction terms with Local and CBI, together with other 
exogenous variables and year dummies. The predicted values of the three variables are then 
included in the second-stage regression as follows: 
 
∆	, = 
 + 
	 + 
 + 
	',._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% + 
',. $_ × %+

	 + 
	 ∆, +∑ 

,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Firm is a vector of firm characteristics including Q, Size, Tang, WC and Div as defined in Table 1, 
in year t. ∆Firm is the change in Firm from t to t+2. Year-fixed effects and firm-fixed effects are 
added but not reported. The standard errors are reported in the parentheses. *,**,*** represent 
10%, 5% and 1% significant levels respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆_ ! 
Local  -0.005 0.030* -0.083* -0.089 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.044) (0.098) 
CBI -0.047*** -0.023 -0.134** 0.074 
 (0.014) (0.022) (0.052) (0.120) 
DB_Cover 1.395*** 1.133** 5.538*** -8.539*** 
 (0.360) (0.565) (1.378) (3.181) 
Local × DB_Cover -0.030 -0.094 -0.025 0.743** 
 (0.041) (0.064) (0.157) (0.344) 
CBI × DB_Cover 0.139*** 0.088 0.448** -0.961** 
 (0.046) (0.072) (0.176) (0.398) 
∆Q 0.035*** 0.029*** 0.106*** -0.071*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.011) (0.025) 
∆Size 0.069*** 0.046*** 0.193*** -0.345*** 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.028) (0.063) 
∆Tang -0.053 -0.004 0.342** -1.571*** 
 (0.040) (0.063) (0.153) (0.343) 
∆WC 0.136*** 0.135*** 0.374*** -0.334** 
 (0.019) (0.030) (0.074) (0.159) 
∆Div -0.007 -0.006 -0.113 0.039 
 (0.053) (0.092) (0.224) (0.443) 
Q 0.014*** 0.029*** 0.028* -0.073** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.016) (0.037) 
Size 0.004 0.006 -0.019 -0.250*** 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.036) (0.085) 
Tang 0.190*** 0.221*** 0.898*** -1.895*** 
 (0.050) (0.079) (0.192) (0.429) 
WC 0.035 0.008 0.125 -0.458 
 (0.037) (0.058) (0.142) (0.299) 
Div -0.561*** -0.414 -1.676*** -0.154 
 (0.166) (0.265) (0.645) (1.405) 
CumRet  -0.014*** -0.032*** -0.070*** 0.022 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.013) (0.029) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald chi-2 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Over-identification J-stat (p-
value) 
0.18 0.97 0.11 0.00 
N 16,920 16,868 16,875 16,209 
 
 
 
